Gerald Clore

" Emotions have many facets. They involve feelings and experience, they involve physiology and behavior, and they involve cognitions and conceptualizations. There are important questions that can be asked about the expression of emotions (eg, Fernâandez-Dols & Russell, 2017; Keltner et al., 2019), and the language of emotion constitutes an interesting research domain in its own right (eg, Lindquist et al., 2015; Wierzbicka, 1999). But in this book, although we will surely have quite a bit to say about, especially, the relation between language and emotions, our main concern will be with the contribution that cognition makes to emotion. In particular, we will focus on the role of the system of cognitive representations--the value system--that leads people to appraise the situations in which they find themselves as good or bad, as beneficial or harmful, or, more generally, as positive or negative, that is, valenced. The value system, which we take to be comprised of three classes of cognitive representations--(the current state of) a person's goals, standards, and tastes--is central to the theory that we propose. Broadly speaking, goals (ie, representations of desired states of the world) are"--

На примере задачи «прерванного поиска» рассмотрена динамика возобновления выполнения основного задания после прерывания. Показана большая эффективность свободных переключений. Возможным объяснительным механизмом является построение компактной репрезентации основного задания.

Perception of the physical environment and emotions relevant to the social environment are integrated into a resource-based account. Animals, unlike plants, must move around their environment to obtain resources and avoid predators, which in turn necessitates perception. Animate creatures also must coordinate perceptions of their internal and external environments to balance bodily expenditures of energy and environmental demands. Consequently, perceptions of distances and the steepness of hills increase with exhaustion and glucose depletion and decrease with physical fitness. They also increase with emotions of sadness and fear and decrease with the accessibility of social resources. Social support during times of stress even increases the available glucose in the blood. The extraordinary success of the human species is believed to have depended on their living in cooperative social groups …

Freud’s underlying model was that repression involved the splitting of instinctual energy from an unacceptable idea so that it could not reach consciousness. This objectless energy could still achieve expression, however, by attaching itself to an associated but harmless idea, which would then be propelled into consciousness. In the present chapter, this model are extrapolated from the domain of affective experience to the domain of cognitive experience more generally. The chapter shows that the mood-as-information model can serve as a more general model of judgment in which various kinds of cognitive experience act as information. It reviews the implications of an informational interpretation of the effects of mood on evaluative judgment, and they have extended the hypothesis to cover the role of what might be called “cognitive feelings” on judgments about knowing.